We examine whether stronger patent protection promotes privatesector R&D, using changes in the patent rights regime of exportdestination countries as an exogenous source of variation.
Introduction
Intellectual property rights, and patents in particular, are among the key institutions that influence private innovative activity. They allow agents to appropriate their creations, thereby providing increased incentives to innovate. Yet even as strong patenting regimes have spread, they have come under increased criticism amid speculation that, in their current form, they may be stifling innovation (Jaffe and Lerner, 2011) . In an influential paper, Boldrin and Levine (2013) begin by stating that "the case against patents can be summarised briefly: there is no empirical evidence that they serve to increase innovation." Indeed, the existing evidence is mixed at best and this lack of strong evidence is often referred to as the "patent puzzle." Determining whether patent rights promote innovation therefore remains an important question with significant policy implications.
The challenge in addressing this question is that patent protection is endogenous. A positive correlation between R&D and domestic patent rights could arise because firms that expect to ramp up R&D expenditures lobby the government for increased patent rights so as to better protect their investment. Alternatively, governments may enact stronger patent protection in response to some expectation of increased domestic R&D.
One could envision a number of other scenarios where unobserved variables might influence both domestic patent strength and R&D.
In this paper, we test this relationship between patent rights and private R&D, using changes in the patent rights regime of export destination countries as an exogenous source of variation. The premise is that a firm considering whether to undertake the development of a new product compares the costs of R&D with the profit stream that the product is expected to earn, not just domestically but also in foreign markets. 1 To the extent that the firm will enjoy a stronger or longer monopoly in its export markets, it has a greater expected foreign income stream associated with the innovation and will therefore have a stronger incentive to perform R&D.
Further, because within a given country different industries export to different destinations, they will effectively face different incentives to innovate. For example, Singapore's largest export industry in 1987, Chemicals, had Japan, Malaysia and Indonesia as its three biggest destination countries, while its second largest export industry, Communications Equipment, exported the most to the United States, Malaysia and the United Kingdom (see Figure 1) . Because between 1990 and 1995, patent rights were significantly strengthened in the United States and the United Kingdom, but less so in Japan and Indonesia, ceteris paribus we would expect that if stronger patents indeed foster innovation, the Singapore Communications Equipment industry would have increased R&D expenditures more than the Chemical industry over that period.
More generally, we test whether R&D responds to the patent regime of export markets by constructing an export-weighted foreign patent rights measure at the countryindustry-year level for a sample of 20 mostly OECD countries. Controlling for numerous covariates, as well as fixed effects including country, industry, year, and their interaction, we find evidence that R&D responds strongly not only to the domestic patent regime but also to changes in the patent regime of export markets. The latter result provides strong evidence that firms do indeed perform more R&D in response to stronger patent rights in that it is not subject to the same endogeneity concerns.
To be sure, we are not proposing that foreign patent regimes are completely exogenous. Firms could lobby foreign countries either directly or through their own government. The TRIPS agreement is a case in point. It was pushed most fervently by the United States following prolonged domestic lobbying by Pfizer and others (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000) . We suggest that foreign patent rights are subject to fewer endogeneity concerns than domestic patent rights. And for the large majority of countries that are too small to effectively lobby on the world stage, foreign patent rights are plausibly exogenous. Importantly, our results are robust to restricting the subsample to these smaller countries.
We also examine whether the relationship between patent protection and R&D is non-monotonic and whether it is stronger for patent-sensitive industries. Overall, we find that firms indeed perform more R&D in response to stronger patent protection, though only up to a point. Further, this relationship is strongest in patent-sensitive industries.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the previous literature, while section 3 discusses our methodology, our data, and summary statistics. Section 4 presents and discusses our empirical results and section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
The theoretical case for patent protection begins with the understanding that innovation and knowledge are unlike other goods. Innovations are non-rival and only partially excludable. To the extent that the knowledge underlying an innovation is a public good, innovation will be underprovided by the market due to a positive information externality. Patent protection seeks to address this problem by allowing inventors to exclude others from using the innovation for a period of time. The theoretical literature on optimal patent protection has long recognised that a policy of stronger patent rights trades off static welfare losses (due to the temporary monopoly) with dynamic welfare gains (due to increased incentives for innovation) (Arrow, 1962; Nordhaus, 1969) . 2 Crucially, then, any argument in favour of stronger patents rests on the case that it will result in a significantly higher level of innovation.
Yet the empirical evidence in this regard remains mixed. In a survey of U.S. patent reforms and their impact on innovation, Jaffe (1999) concludes that little empirical evidence supports the theory that stronger patents increase innovation. Park and Ginarte (1997) examine a panel of countries and find that the strength of a country's patents is positively correlated with R&D, though only for developed countries. Kanwar and Evenson (2003) and Allred and Park (2007) , using a similar methodology to that of Park and Ginarte (1997) , also find a positive correlation between patent strength and R&D expenditures. However, in a paper that exploits the 1988 expansion of patent scope in Japan, Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) find no effect of stronger patent protection on R&D. Qian (2007) controls for a country's innovative potential using nonparametric matching and finds that stronger patents do not increase the R&D of pharmaceutical firms except at higher levels of economic development, and then only up to a point. Kyle and McGahan (2012) exploit cross-country variation in the prevalence of diseases and the time that TRIPS was adopted in these countries to determine whether stronger patent protection impacts pharmaceutical R&D spending. They find that increased patent protection in developed countries is associated with increased R&D on the diseases that are most prevalent in those countries, but the same is not true for developing countries.
While the primary contribution of this paper is to use foreign patent rights as a more exogenous source of variation to show that private-sector R&D responds to the patent regime, the relationship between domestic R&D and trade partner patent protection is also interesting in and of itself, and constitutes a second contribution of this paper. A significant theoretical literature addresses the topic, primarily within the context of a North-South model (Helpman, 1993; Lai, 1998; Glass and Saggi, 2002; Branstetter and Saggi, 2011; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2010) . Although for the most part these models predict a positive relationship between Northern innovation and Southern patent rights, the result depends on the channel being examined and the particulars of the model. For example, Glass and Saggi (2002) find that stronger foreign patent rights result in imitation being more difficult, which leads to resource wasting, lower levels of foreign direct investment, and reduced domestic innovation.
The empirical literature examining how innovation responds to foreign patent rights is relatively newer. Qiu and Yu (2010) find that U.S. patenting rates increased in response to the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. However, they do not find U.S.
patenting rates to be affected by the strengthening of patent protection by individual or small groups of countries. Most recently, in a paper employing a similar methodology to ours, Park (2012) examines whether Southern patent regimes affect Northern innovation using a micro-database of U.S. multinationals and their foreign affiliates. He finds that the R&D expenditures of these U.S. firms do not respond significantly to the level of patent rights in developing countries, instead responding to the strength of patents in other developed countries. To arrive at this result, he separately constructs a tradeweighted index of foreign patent rights for developing and developed partner countries using the U.S. national share of exports to any particular country as weights (because firm-level exports were unobserved).
Our paper has a different focus in that foreign patent rights are used as an exogenous source of variation to establish a causal relationship between patent regimes and R&D. In addition, our data allows us to use a more robust methodology. We merge private-sector R&D, production, and trade data at the level of the country-industry-year for 20 countries, 42 industries, and the years 1988 to 2005. We examine the relationship between private-sector R&D and the export-weighted foreign patents regime, both of which vary by country, industry, and year. As such, we are able to include in our regressions, not only numerous controls, but also fixed effects for the country, industry, year, and their interaction. We therefore identify the relationship based on differences across countries, industries, and time. For example, we find that otherwise similar industries in the same country exhibit different changes in their level of R&D as a function of having exports that are tilted towards markets with different changes in the level of patent protection. As discussed in the next section, we also address the potential issue of endogeneity in the choice of export partners (and hence of the export-weighted foreign patent rights measure) by fixing the country-industry's export shares at presample levels.
Data and Methodology
To examine the impact of patent regimes on investment in innovation, we combine country-year-level data on patent rights with data on business R&D expenditures, industrial output, and imports, each of which are across countries, industries, and time.
The two most commonly used proxies for measuring innovation are patent counts and R&D expenditures. While neither is perfect, R&D is a better choice for our purposes since a positive relationship between patent protection and the number of patents could have been due to firms altering how they protect their innovations (shifting, for example, from using trade secrets to using patents in response to patent rights). We obtain our measure of business enterprise R&D expenditure ( Each factor has a value ranging between zero and one. The range of the aggregate score is therefore from zero (weakest) to five (strongest). Ginarte and Park (1997) provide a more extensive description of this index and its creation.
In order to determine whether business R&D responds to the patent regime in export destination markets, we construct an export-weighted IPR (EIPR). EIPR is computed as the weighted average of the export partners' IPR, where the weights are the share of a country-industry-year's exports to a particular destination country. More formally, defining "#$% as the value of exports of country i's industry k at time t to destination country j, we have: , where subscript i refers to the country of origin, j the destination country, k the industry,
and t the year. The summation is over all export destination countries for which we have an IPR.
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EIPR is comprised of two components that vary over time: dynamic trade flows and the IPR of the export country. These dynamic trade flows are endogenous in that exports may flow to countries with high levels of IPR for reasons that are related to the R&D intensity in the exporting country. In particular, we might expect that industries that increase their R&D expenditures (i.e., develop higher quality products) would shift exports toward more developed (and higher IPR) export markets. It would be incorrect, therefore, to interpret a positive relationship between R&D intensity and EIPR as evidence that firms respond to increases in the IPR of foreign partners by increasing R&D expenditures. More generally, we are concerned that an omitted variable correlated with R&D may be influencing the export dynamics.
We address this issue by fixing export shares at pre-sample (1987) Our specifications also include a number of controls. Following the literature, we control for the size of government by including total government expenditure 8 (as a percentage of GDP). We also control for a key input to the innovative process, human capital, which we measure as the total enrolment in tertiary education as a percentage of the population. We obtain both variables from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database. These control variables, both country characteristics that vary over time, serve primarily to generate a more reasonable estimate on the effect of domestic IPR on R&D intensity since, in our preferred specification examining the relationship between R&D intensity and partner IPR, we will be including interacted country-year fixed effects.
We also control for the export partner GDP per capita. Our concern is that, in the absence of this control, our PIPR index could be measuring the level of development of export partners and not their IPR (since a country's IPR and GDP per capita are correlated). We therefore construct, at the country-industry-year level, an exportweighted partner GDP per capita index in the same way that we have constructed the PIPR index, using 1987 export shares as the weights. We also obtain our GDP per capita variable from the WDI database. 
Descriptive Statistics

Estimating Equation
Our estimating equation for jointly determining the effect of domestic and foreign partner IPR takes the following form:
) "$% = < "% + = "$% + < "$% + = "% + δ P + δ Q + δ R + ϵ PQR , where our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of R&D intensity (R&D/Output). < measures R&D intensity's responsiveness to domestic IPR and = the responsiveness to export partners' IPR (both DIPR and PIPR are expressed in natural logs). X represents our vector of control variables that vary either by country-industryyear (partner GDP per capita and trade openness) or by country-year (government expenditure and human capital). Our specification also includes country, industry, and year fixed effects to account for additional factors that could affect R&D intensity.
As discussed, we are concerned that domestic IPR is endogenous because firms planning to increase R&D may lobby governments for increased protection or governments may proactively increase domestic IPR in the face of higher expected R&D to better protect the investment of home firms. Since we can't observe the occurrence of such scenarios, they result in an omitted variable bias. In more formal terms, the error term could contain a component that varies by country-year (e.g., firm lobbying) and is correlated with domestic IPR. Thus, our estimate of the coefficient on domestic IPR is likely (upward) biased and should be interpreted accordingly.
Therefore, a more reliable way to determine whether stronger patent rights indeed promote increased firm R&D is to examine the effect of PIPR. To the extent that most firms cannot effectively lobby foreign governments and governments do not strive to promote the interests of foreign innovating firms, we would not expect a correlation between this omitted variable and PIPR.
To further ensure the robustness of our results, some of our specifications include interacted country-year, industry-year, and country-industry fixed effects. Country-year fixed effects control for factors such as the country's level of development, government R&D expenditure, educational attainment, population, and the domestic intellectual property rights regime.
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Industry-year fixed effects control for any industry characteristics that are changing over time such as whether an industry is evolving to become more or less R&D dependent. Finally, country-industry fixed effects capture any industry characteristics that are particular to a country, such as, for example, whether the industry is more capital intensive in the focal country than it is in other countries. As will be shown, adding any or all of these fixed effects does not significantly change the results. Table 2 presents the results of these empirical models. Column 1 presents the regression for our first estimating equation with domestic IPR, export partner IPR, the full set of control variables, and country, industry, and year fixed effects as regressors.
Results and Discussion
Column 2 adds industry-year interacted fixed effects, while Column 3 further adds country-year fixed effects. Column 4 includes the full set of interacted fixed effects.
< Table 2 > 11 This interacted fixed effect also rules out the lobbying omitted variable bias considered above. Together, the three interacted fixed effects rule out any potential omitted variable bias except where the omitted variable varies by country-industry-year.
Column 1 suggests that both domestic and foreign partner IPR positively impact firm R&D. Both coefficients are significant at the 5% level. However, we need to exercise caution in this interpretation, particularly in the case of domestic IPR, since the estimate likely suffers from an omitted variable bias. The relative magnitudes of the coefficients on DIPR and PIPR are perhaps surprising until we consider that, according to our measure of openness, an average of 81% of productive output is exported. Therefore, it is not unexpected that for this sample of countries foreign IPR has a larger impact on firm R&D than domestic IPR. Among the control variables, only the degree of trade openness is significant. As expected, the coefficient is positive, at least until country-industry fixed effects are introduced, at which point the coefficient is indistinguishable from zero. This is not surprising since most of the variation in the trade openness variable is across different country-industries.
Adding industry-year fixed effects (Column 2) lowers our estimate of the coefficient on both DIPR and PIPR, though they remain large and significant at the 5% level under this more robust specification. Column 3 adds country-year fixed effects, and therefore we drop variables that vary by country-year from the specification (domestic IPR, government expenditure, and human capital). The coefficient on foreign partner IPR is significant at the 1% level.
Our preferred specification, which includes all three interacted fixed effects, is presented in Column 4. We find that export partner IPR still maintains a positive and significant effect (at the 10% level) on domestic R&D. Specifically, we see that a 1%
increase in foreign-partner IPR is associated with a 1.271% increase in domestic R&D investment. Taken together, our results suggest that patent protection has a significant impact on firm R&D.
Trade Openness and Foreign Partner IPR
The coefficients reported above are for the mean across all countries, including some of the larger countries that export smaller fractions of their output. The premise behind this paper is that firm R&D responds to the IPR regime of trade partners because stronger protection in the markets where they sell their products will yield them higher returns to innovation. Therefore, we would expect that the R&D of country-industries that rely more on export markets would respond more strongly to export partner IPR.
We test this prediction by adding a population x PIPR interaction term to our regression. 12 As discussed, countries with smaller populations tend to be more open to trade. Therefore, we expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be negative (smaller countries respond more to PIPR). Table 3 confirms that this is the case.
< Table 3 >
The coefficient on the interaction term is negative throughout. The results suggest a large variation in how responsive countries are to foreign partner IPR, from a large response for small countries to essentially no response for the largest countries. Our most robust specification with the full set of interacted fixed effects finds the largest variation across country size (Column 4). The coefficients on PIPR and its interaction are significant and predict that a 1% increase in foreign partner IPR is associated with a 5.5% increase in domestic R&D for Iceland (our smallest country, with a population of 261,000), while for the U.S. (our largest country with a population of 288 million), it is associated with a 1.5% decrease. Of course, the coefficients estimate average effects and are best interpreted as predicting the response of countries that are closer to the population mean (which explains the negative result for the U.S.). For our mean sized country (with a population of 36.8 million), a 1% increase in foreign partner IPR is associated with a 0.6% increase in domestic R&D investment.
As an aside, this result that R&D in smaller countries responds more to foreign IPR also helps to allay the concern that foreign IPR is not exogenous because countries (and their firms) are, through trade agreements, influencing foreign IPR. We would expect larger countries such as the U.S. to exert the most influence on foreign IPR through agreements such as TRIPS, and yet the R&D of large countries responds the least strongly to foreign IPR. Conversely, small countries such as Singapore and Iceland are unlikely to exert much influence on foreign IPR, and their R&D responds most strongly.
For completeness, it is worth noting that, as expected, the coefficients on government expenditures are positively correlated with R&D (and significant). Part of these government expenditures may be subsidies to R&D. Alternatively, we may view this result as governments providing public goods that promote innovation. Or it could be that more innovation results in higher growth and increased government expenditures. The surprising result is that higher levels of enrollment in tertiary education are negatively correlated with R&D. We do not have a good explanation for this apparent result, although given the marginal significance of the coefficient here, and the fact that the same coefficients are insignificant in Tables 2 and 4 , it may simply be a spurious finding.
Non-Monotonicity between IPR and R&D
Previous theoretical and empirical studies have proposed the possibility that there may be diminishing returns to strengthening IPR. For instance, Helpman (2003) develops a dynamic general equilibrium model and finds that stronger IPR may in fact inhibit innovation in the long run. Murray and Stern (2007) , Williams (2013) , and Galasso and Schankerman (2014) find that IPR can stifle follow-on innovation. The reason is that when patent rights are too broad, new innovators will frequently be subject to hold-up by previous innovators and may therefore choose not to pursue otherwise profitable innovation projects in the first place. This is especially true in the face of information asymmetries and innovative uncertainties, so that ex-ante licensing agreements are not possible.
Following Allred & Park (2007) , we examine the possibility that the effect of foreign partner IPR on R&D is not monotonic by including a quadratic IPR term. The results are presented in Table 4 , where Column 4 gives the results of the fully specified model and
Column 5 adds the population interaction term.
< Table 4 > The addition of the quadratic term has very little effect on our previous results from Tables 2 and 3 . The coefficient on the linear IPR and PIPR terms remains significant across all specifications, and the magnitudes are relatively unchanged. Similarly, the coefficient on the population interaction term in column 5 is unchanged.
Consistent with the literature, the quadratic IPR and PIPR terms are always negative (though only significant in the specification with no interacted fixed effects), suggesting a decreasing marginal impact of both domestic and foreign partner IPR on R&D. The point estimates suggest that the optimal level of IPR, in terms of encouraging R&D, lies to the right of the actual observed range of IPR. That is, our coefficients suggest that, keeping everything else constant, R&D expenditures would be highest for IPR scores of 6 or higher, depending on the specification. As shown in Table 1 , the highest domestic and foreign partner IPR scores in our sample are 4.88 and 4.85, respectively. This, of course, does not imply that strengthening patent rights would be welfare improving, since our analysis does not account for the deadweight losses that patents generate.
Industry Sensitivity to Patent Rights
Firms can employ numerous approaches, other than patents, to appropriate the value of their innovation. Alternative methods include secrecy, copyrights, trademarks, a firstmover advantage, or complementary assets in manufacturing or distribution. We would therefore expect the effect of IPR as an incentive to perform R&D to vary by industry. In particular, industries where patents are an effective way to appropriate the value of innovations should exhibit a stronger R&D response to changes in export market IPR.
We classify our 42 industries into more and less sensitive to patent rights and conduct our analysis on each subsample. Our classification is based on the work of Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) , who surveyed 1478 U.S. R&D labs in the manufacturing sector and determined, by industry, the mean percentage of product innovations for which patents were deemed to be an effective mechanism for appropriation. The mean patent effectiveness score in our sample was 32.0, therefore industries with a score above that were classified as patent sensitive, and those below as less patent sensitive. For six of our industries, Cohen et al. did not provide a patent effectiveness score (either due to their different industry classification or because they did not survey any firms in that sector) and we therefore classified the industry based on how similar industries had been classified. 13 The full classification of industries is presented in the appendix.
The first three columns of table 5 present the results for the set of industries that are most patent sensitive. Across all three specifications we find the effect of export partner IPR on R&D to be highly significant and much larger than what we found for the full sample. In the specification with the full set of interacted fixed effects (column 3) we find that a 1% increase in PIPR contributes a 1.933% increase in R&D (compared to 1.148% for the full sample). For the less patent sensitive industries (columns 4-6) we find much smaller effects of PIPR on R&D. In particular, for our specification with the full set of interacted fixed effects (column 6) we find that a 1% increase in PIPR generates essentially no change (an insignificant 0.053% decrease) in R&D.
Overall, these results suggest that patents promote firm R&D, particularly in industrial sectors where patents are effective as a means of protecting an innovation.
Conclusion
The primary objective of this paper was to determine whether stronger patent rights encourage private-sector investment in R&D. Our results provide new and compelling 13 In particular, "Apparel" (18) and "Leather" (19) were classified as patent insensitive like "Textiles" (17), "Wood products" (20) was classified as sensitive like "Paper and paper products" (21), and "Boat building and repairing" (351), "Transport Equipment n.e.c." (359), and "Railway locomotives" (3520) were classified as sensitive like both "Motor vehicles" (34) and "Aircraft and spacecraft"
.
evidence that they indeed do, at least for the relatively developed set of countries in our sample. We arrive at this conclusion not by directly examining the relationship between domestic firm R&D and domestic IPR, which could be endogenous, but by using export partner IPR as a more exogenous source of variation in the incentives faced by firms. A second advantage of our approach is that this foreign partner IPR measure that we constructed varies by country, industry, and time (unlike domestic R&D); we can therefore control for a broader set of unobservables through the use of interacted fixed effects. This more robust analysis finds a strong relationship between R&D and IPR, particularly for smaller, more open, economies, and for the set of industries where patents are an effective method for appropriating the value of an innovation.
It is important to note, however, that we cannot conclude from these results that stronger patent rights are merited. These results address an important, yet unresolved, piece of the discussion on the merits of patents. To the extent that patents do in fact encourage private sector R&D, it becomes possible that strong patent regimes are warranted, but only if this benefit outweighs the deadweight losses associated with increased market power and the transaction costs associated with patent applications and enforcement. If anything, our finding of diminishing R&D returns to increasing IPR suggests that it may not be optimal to have stronger patents.
Further, from a societal perspective the objective is to foster innovation, not R&D, and while higher levels of R&D are generally associated with increased innovation, this may not always be the case. In particular, one can envision a scenario where stronger patents increase the costs of inventing around previous patents, increasing R&D but not affecting innovation (or even affecting innovation adversely). Thus, it is entirely possible that patents promote R&D but not innovation, and therefore that patents are welfare destroying.
Beyond contributing to the discussion on whether stronger patents encourage privatesector innovation, our results also highlight the fact that the R&D incentives of firms are framed not only by the patent regime in their home country but also by the regime in their export markets. As such, and to the extent that countries have an incentive to free-ride off the patent regimes of trade partners, there exists a rationale for bundling patent protection with trade agreements.
We foresee two important avenues for future work. First, we believe that firm-level studies are warranted, ideally for relatively small open economies where firms are more likely to be export-oriented and hence responsive to changes in foreign IPR. The challenge is to obtain firm-level data that includes both firm R&D expenditures and firm exports by destination country, and this over a long enough time horizon. Second, and most importantly, we must strive towards a welfare analysis of the merits of patent rights.
While it might be difficult to directly pursue this agenda, hence the numerous studies examining the different pieces of the puzzle, it is only by addressing the larger welfare question that we may satisfactorily answer the crucial question of how and in what direction we should reform patent regimes.
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